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Introduction 
For many, the discovery in the summer of 2000 of the corpses of 58 Chinese inside a sealed 
cargo container in Dover has come to symbolize the desperate lengths that Asian migrants 
have been willing to go to in order to reach European shores.  But the story of Asian migration 
to Europe is much too long and complex to be summed up by any one event, no matter how 
tragic it may be. Not only with regard to Asia, but in general, shocking events and popular 
images of impoverished, desperate migrants are widely distributed by Europe’s media outlets. 
On the other hand, certain immigration programs such as those targeted at technology 
specialists from abroad are widely viewed as beneficial. Thus, European migration and asylum 
policies are characterized by a paradox: It has become abundantly clear that Europe must open 
additional legal channels for migration in order to cope with the immense challenges posed by 
demographic and economic changes and growing international migration ‘pressure,’ be it 
forced or voluntary migration.  Political leaders in almost every EU state have openly 
conceded that Europe’s future prosperity and stability will depend to a certain extent on 
developing a comprehensive immigration policy capable of attracting and integrating 
immigrants.  They have failed, however, to sell the idea to their electorates.  This failure is due 
in large part to a widespread fear of rising populist and far-right movements in most European 
states.  These groups owe much of their popularity to the popular perception that immigration 
is already out of control.  They offer simple solutions to complex problems, and often promise 
to cut off immigration entirely—an option that is impossible in Europe’s democratic states.   
For the time being, the response of the EU Member States and the European institutions is 
focused on limiting legal immigration and reducing irregular immigration—a policy known as 
‘fortress Europe.’  In light of the aging and shrinking of Europe’s population and the demands 
of globalisation for mobility and multiculturalism, this policy is seriously short-sighted and 
counterproductive.  This paper first describes the current trends in Asian migration to Europe 
and then analyses the European response to international forced and voluntary migration with 
special attention paid to the policy shifts that have occurred in the last decade.  The paper 
concludes with some proposals for future Asian-European co-operation in this policy field, 
which was identified by EU Council President Josep Piqué at the June 2002 Asian European 
Foreign Ministers Meeting as ‘probably the most important item of political and social debate 
we will have to deal with over the next few decades.’ 
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Current Trends of Asian Migration to Europe 
According to the latest UN Population Division statistics the fifteen Member States of the 
European Union are now home to some 26 million migrants, making the foreign-born 
population slightly more than 7 percent of the total.1  The majority of these are not Asian.  
Instead they are primarily from the former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe 
and from the Balkans or from other EU member states. Still, one only needs to look around in 
any of Europe’s increasingly multicultural urban centres to know that people from Asia are 
having an impact.  In order to know precisely how much of a factor they really are, it is first 
necessary to get a rough idea of their numbers, but this kind of data is very difficult to obtain.  
A main reason for this is the fact that due to restrictive European immigration policies many 
migrants from Asia and other regions are irregular, entering Europe clandestinely and working 
in the shadow economy without ever registering or showing up in official statistics.  
Asian Immigrants in Europe 
All European countries have been under a labour recruitment stop since the mid 1970s.  This 
means that there are hardly any channels for legal migration.  In addition to asylum for 
refugees, the only ones that are still available are short term labour contracts, family 
reunification, special recruitment schemes for highly skilled workers, programmes for foreign 
students, and special citizenship programs for ethnic communities abroad.  The data recorded 
on legal migrants includes all of these.  For obvious reasons they do not include irregular 
immigrants.  As such they should not be used as final accounting of the migrant population, 
but rather as a guide to observing migration trends, for example in terms of origin and 
destination.   
Turning to the data, some important new trends of Asian immigration to Europe appear to be 
under way.  Firstly, Asian migration appears to be diversifying both in terms of the source of 
flows and their destination.  Traditionally the United Kingdom and France owing to their 
colonial histories in the Indian sub-continent and Southeast Asia have had Europe’s largest 
Asian populations, and in recent years the Asian inflows to these countries have intensified.  
In the UK, for example, Asians now make up 17.5 percent of the total foreign population, the 
                                                 
1
  International Migration 2002, United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/ittmig2002.htm 
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largest proportion in Europe. In recent years other European states too have become important 
destinations for Asian migrants.  Germany, for instance, which has long had an established 
Turkish population is now home to 85,000 Vietnamese, 55,000 Sri Lankans, 43,000 Chinese, 
38,000 Pakistanis, 34,000 Indians, and 34,000 Thais, as well as significant Filipino, Korean, 
Malaysian, Indonesian, and Bangladeshi populations.2  Italy too now has a sizeable Asian 
population: 61,000 Filipinos, 47,000 Chinese, 30,000 Sri Lankans, 25,000 Indians, 15,000 
Bangladeshis, 14,000 Pakistanis, and small numbers of other Asian nationalities. Data 
published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) show 
that the numbers of nationals from 11 leading sending countries in Asia3 have become 
noticeable in other European states as well.  (See Table 1) 
Table 1: Stocks of Foreign Nationals, 1999 
Country Stock of Foreign Nationals (1999) Largest Asian Groups 
Denmark 259,400 Pakistan (7,100), Sri Lanka (4,900), Vietnam (5,000) 
France (1990) 3,596,600 Vietnam (33,700), China (14,100), Sri Lanka (10,300) 
Germany 7,343,600 Vietnam (85,400), Sri Lanka (55,100), China (42,900) 
Italy 1,252,000 Philippines (61,000), China (47,100), Sri Lanka (29,900) 
Netherlands 651,500 Indonesia (8,700), China (8,200), India (3,200) 
Spain 801,300 China (24,700), Philippines (13,800), India (8,500) 
Sweden 487,200 Thailand (5,500), China (4,200), Vietnam (2,600) 
United Kingdom 234,200 India (153,000), Pakistan (94,000), Bangladesh (55,000) 
 
Source: Trends in International Migration: 2001, OECD, 2001 
As Asian immigrant populations grow in numbers and diversify in terms of destination and 
source, their impact is felt more and more.  However, there are a number of reasons why the 
magnitude of the Asian migration to Europe should not be overstated.  For one, Asian 
migrants tend to be concentrated primarily in large urban centres, a fact which holds true for 
Europe’s other immigrant groups as well.  In Germany, for example, the foreign populations 
in the metropolises of Berlin and Hamburg are about 13.5 and 15 percent, well above the 
national average; the highly urban federal state of Hessen, which includes Frankfurt a.M. and 
Germany’s largest international airport has the country’s largest immigrant total at 
                                                 
2
  Trends in International Migration: 2001, OECD, 2001, p. 65 
3
  Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, Pakistan, The Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. 
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approximately 27 percent.4  Thus, while Asian immigrants are very visible members of 
society, they do not directly impact on life in all parts of the host countries.   
From the point of view of the Asian states where migration is a seeming fact of life, migration 
to Europe is hardly the dominant feature.  Indeed, the true story of Asian migration is still one 
of migration within home countries and within the region and only to a minor degree 
movements to other regions of the world. Even in the context of emigration out of the region, 
Asian migrants’ rush to Europe needs to be put in the proper perspective.  Europe is the 
primary destination for some groups, such as West Asians (including Middle Easterners), but 
the aggregate migration of all Asian groups to North America far exceeds Europe’s total.  
Even migrants of Indian nationality with their historical ties to and strong communities in 
Great Britain are more than six times more numerous in the United States and Canada than in 
the UK.5 
It is also important to remember that the actual presence of Asians in the European population 
is masked to a certain degree by the fact that many migrants have become citizens in the 
countries they have settled in.  In Belgium, for example, over the last decade an average of 
about 150 Indians per year have acquired Belgian citizenship, 172 when the last figures were 
released in 1999. 6  The data from Denmark, France and Spain too show that over the past 
decade thousands of Pakistanis, Sri Lankans and Indians have been naturalized in those 
countries.7  Other Asian groups to acquire nationality in these European states include 
migrants from Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and China.  As one might expect, the 
United Kingdom, which for historical reasons has the closest ties to South Asia has by far the 
largest contingent of new citizens of South Asian origin.  Indeed, roughly 10,000 of them or 
more are naturalized in the UK every year, 14,786 when data was last reported in 1999.8 There 
are also thousands more from the Middle East and the remainder of Asia.   
One Asian group that is routinely neglected is Central Asians.  This is largely because their 
                                                 
4
  http://www.bundesauslaenderbeauftragte.de/daten/tab12.pdf 
5
  Trends in International Migration: 2001, OECD, 2001, p. 65; The data also show that a greater proportion of 
the Indian nationals in Britain acquire citizenship than those in America.  This does not, however, make up for 
the shortfall.  See below. 
6
  Ibid, p. 334 
7
  Ibid, pp. 335-40 
8
  Ibid, p. 341 
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numbers are negligible in most of Europe. In Germany, however, they now make up a vast and 
still growing segment of the population.  Most of the immigrants in this group are ethnic 
Germans who despite long separation from Germany, centuries in many cases, have heretofore 
been allowed to acquire German citizenship almost immediately.  But in the sociological sense 
(and often culturally and linguistically as well) they are essentially foreigners.  Their numbers 
are indeed prodigious: over 100,000 Kazakhs acquired German citizenship in 1995 and a 
somewhat lower number in each year since, 83,478 at last reporting in 1998. 9  To put these 
figures in perspective, in the latter half of the nineties twice as many Kazakhs were naturalized 
in Germany as Turks, historically Germany’s most numerous and visible immigrant group.  
However, the Kazakh immigrants have a special legal status as ethnic Germans, which gives 
them virtually immediate access to such critical resources as government services and the 
labour market and thus more of an incentive to move.  The same laws have enabled many 
thousands more of German and Jewish ancestry from the Russian Federation to legally enter 
Germany as well.   
Refugees and Forced Migrants 
One major data source of migration that needs to be included in any estimate of the overall 
migration total is the amount of asylum applications.  However, it must be emphasised that 
forced migrants are a very special group and if they are officially recognized as refugees they 
enjoy certain privileges under international law. Other migrants do not have a comparable 
legal status.10  Reliable and detailed statistics are kept on the numbers of asylum applicants, 
their countries of origin and destination, and the determinations made by review boards on 
their legal status.  On this score, of the forty top countries of origin of asylum seekers entering 
Europe (not just the European Union) fourteen were Asian11 in the first two thirds of 2002, 
                                                 
9
  Ibid, p. 336 
10
  According to the most current statistics available, Europe (broadly defined) has a refugee population of 2.2. 
million out of an overall foreign population many times larger.  See UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2001. 
11
  The definitions of ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ vary and can be controversial.  The broadest definition of Asia and the 
one relied on in this paper is the UN Population Division’s definition, which breaks the continent into four 
areas: Eastern Asia (ranging from Mongolia, to Japan, to the southern border of China), South-central Asia 
(from Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan, to Kazakhstan, to Burma), South-eastern Asia (from Thailand, to the 
Philippines, to Indonesia), and Western Asia (from the Arabian Peninsula to the Caucasus, to the 
Mediterranean).  ‘Europe’ is broken into Eastern Europe (from the Russian Federation to Bulgaria, to Poland), 
Northern Europe (from Ireland and the United Kingdom to Scandinavia and the Baltic states), Southern 
Europe (from Iberia to Greece and the Balkans), and Western Europe (France, the Benelux countries, 
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which reflects recent trends.12  Indeed, of the 212,125 Asylum Applications lodged from 
January to August 2002, 84,221 or roughly 40 per cent concerned Asian countries of origin.  
Iraq is the largest country of origin of all asylum seekers in Europe.  In the first two thirds of 
2002 more than 19,000 Iraqis applied.  Even small Asian countries such as Georgia and 
Armenia are the sources of thousands of Asylum applicants per year.  (See Table 2) 
Table 2: Asylum Applicants in Europe (January-August 2002) 
Country of Origin Asylum Applicants in Europe (Jan-Aug 2002) 
Iraq 19,263 
Turkey 16,497 
Afghanistan 10,373 
Georgia 5284 
Armenia 5059 
China 4810 
Iran 4633 
India 4229 
Vietnam 2621 
Azerbaijan 2588 
Sri Lanka 2530 
Syria 2303 
Pakistan 2095 
Bangladesh 1936 
TOTAL Asia 84,221 
TOTAL South Asia 10,790 
All Countries 212,125 
Proportion Asian 39.7 % 
Proportion South 
Asian 5.1% 
Source: Trends in Asylum Applications, January - August 2002, Monthly Applications Submitted in Europe by Origin, 2002, 
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=3d94530b7&page=statistics 
 
One has every reason to believe that these numbers are perfectly accurate.  But what the 
numbers may leave out are the many persons whose cases never come before the review 
boards.  There is no telling exactly what proportion of those who in a sociological sense are 
refugees or forced migrants apply for asylum, but one must suppose that the rate is 
                                                                                                                                                         
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland). See http://www.un.org/esa/population. 
12
  Trends in Asylum Applications, January - August 2002, Monthly Applications Submitted in Europe by 
Origin, 2002.  Full year statistics that exist for the each year of the past decade paint a similar picture.  As the 
intensity of regional conflicts has waxed and waned the asylum totals increase and decrease correspondingly.   
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substantially lower than 100 percent.  For as governments across Europe enact stricter 
standards for granting refugee status, the likelihood of being accepted declines as does the 
incentive to apply, while the incentive to seek other ways of entering Europe stays the same.  
The data for the last few years show that application rates are indeed tailing off in some EU 
countries, but increasing in other member states. This may have to do with an increased fear of 
denial on the part of migrants than lower levels of migration.  Similarly, if one country or 
another is rightly or wrongly perceived as safer or to be more receptive than others, then 
refugees may choose to apply there.13  In addition, most recently released UNHCR statistics 
indicate that application rates are decreasing in the EU.  Whereas in 2001 asylum applications 
in the world’s leading industrialised states rose by an estimated 8 percent over the previous 
year’s total, they rose by only 3 percent in Europe and actually declined by 1 percent in the 
Member States of the European Union.14  Those who must flee persecution in their habitual 
places of residence but are unable or unwilling to apply for asylum abroad may either become 
internally displaced within their country of origin or may become what are known as irregular 
immigrants, those who enter another country without legal permission or documentation.  The 
most common way irregular migrants enter foreign countries is to obtain a standard tourist 
visa and simply remain in the country as so-called visa-overstayers. 
Family Reunification 
Family reunification is the most important avenue for legal migration into Europe, and it 
naturally figures highly in the process of policy making.  All European states have laws and 
                                                 
13
  Acceptance rates naturally vary according to the countries of origin.  Since the political change in 
Afghanistan, which had for some years been the leading origin of refugees throughout the world, Afghan 
refugees have been increasingly encouraged to return home.  Many European states (Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, and the Netherlands) have delayed pending decisions while they evaluating their positions.  Some 
have lifted their delays and now tend to turn down Afghan applicants.  Great Britain and France have actually 
negotiated agreements with the new Afghan government and the UNHCR on arrangements for repatriation.  
The EU itself also funds a ‘Return Action Programme’ including a special ‘Afghanistan Programme’ with an 
annual budget of about The UNHCR’s position is that decision delays should be lifted for the most vulnerable 
groups and that those willing to repatriate should be supported.  (Bundesamt für Migration und Fluchtlinge: 
www.bafl.de/template/aktuelles/ee_brief_2002/content_eebrief_2002_10.htm) 
14
  UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2001, p. 13.  The application decline is more dramatic in some countries than in 
others.  Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands reported the sharpest declines at –42, -38, and –26 percent 
respectively.  This is not to say that Europe is somehow not bearing its fair share of the world’s refugee 
burden.  Indeed, looking at the question from a more long-term perspective, in the last two decades the 
world’s industrialised countries have officially admitted around 2 million asylum seekers, 1.6 million of them 
(80%) admitted by European countries. 
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are parties to international human rights conventions that enshrine the family as the basic unit 
of society and the principle that the family structure must not be unduly obstructed by the 
state.  However, as a point of law this does not translate directly into unrestricted family 
reunification privileges for immigrants’ and European citizens’ foreign spouses and children.  
While EU law and national laws all provide some rights of family reunification, nowadays it is 
frequently either restricted, subject to waiting periods, or does not include full, immediate 
access to the labour market. It is important to note that European jurisprudence generally says 
that for the purposes of reunification, the ‘family’ means only the immediate family of spouses 
and children; it does not include other relations who may habitually live in the same 
household, making for a narrower definition than would be used in other parts of the world.   
In recent months Denmark has enacted some of the most thoroughgoing reunification laws, 
and its example may be a sign of things to come.  Under Danish law family reunification is not 
allowed for anyone over 60 years old.  For younger married couples to get family 
reunification, both spouses must be at least 24, and they must be able to demonstrate that they 
have sufficient resources to support themselves.  Denmark also has an unusual new regulation 
known as the ‘51 per cent rule,’ which says that, except under very special circumstances, in 
order for a person legally living in Denmark to be granted family reunification with a spouse 
from a country outside of the European Union, the couple must share a collective attachment 
to Denmark that exceeds their collective attachment to any other country.  In addition to 
having the effect of curtailing legal immigration, such laws ostensibly serve to prevent forced 
and bogus marriages. 15 
Irregular Migrants 
Irregular migrants are the last group making up a significant component of the migrant total.  
There are various ways of becoming an irregular migrant: to enter a country without 
permission (i.e. without a visa), to remain in a country past visa expiration, or to take up 
employment without a permit.  Naturally, these modes of becoming an irregular migrant are 
not mutually exclusive. It is also possible to start as a regular migrant and later become 
irregular and to be irregular and later to be granted legal permission to stay and/or to work, in 
                                                 
15
  See Catherine Hall Uttenthal & Henry Edward Orren, ‘When a Floor Becomes a Ceiling: Danish Immigration 
Law and International Human Rights Conventions’ (unpublished manuscript, 2002). 
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other words to be regularised.  Irregular immigrants are sometimes smuggled or trafficked into 
Europe by international criminal organizations and sometimes participate in illegal activities 
when they arrive, for example to pay debts to smugglers.  This being the case, they and those 
who employ or otherwise assist them risk deportation or prosecution if they are discovered.  
Of course, irregular migrants do not register with any government agencies or do anything to 
reveal their presence.  On the contrary, they do everything they can to avoid detection, 
sometimes going so far as to destroy any travel and identity documents they may have to 
conceal their origins and routes.  Assistance networks throughout the regions make the whole 
process possible.  Data from law enforcement agencies on the number of persons intercepted 
at border crossings and caught illegally residing in the member states are a starting point for 
making an estimate. According to recent press reports, Europol, the European Union’s law 
enforcement arm, estimates that about 500,000 immigrants enter the EU illegally each year, a 
substantial number of them from Asian countries.  An estimated 400,000 of them eventually 
become asylum applicants.16  
Looking at current migration from Asia to Europe raises the question of its possible 
development in the future.  In general, we can expect that the overall level of Asian migration 
will increase.  Labour migration will remain important, as there will continue to be a need for 
at least highly skilled workers and service personnel.  In recent years some European 
countries—notably Germany—have tried to fill labour market shortages through recruitment 
schemes, for example those aimed at Indian Information Technology specialists and Southeast 
Asian health workers.  Such programs are likely to proliferate in the next few years.  As far as 
forced migrants are concerned, even if some long-standing refugee producing conflicts such as 
the one in Afghanistan are solved, it is likely that new conflicts will arise in regions where 
virulent ethnic and religious fault lines exist.  In addition, from the point of view of those 
already settled in Europe, the demand for family reunification will almost certainly increase. 
Meanwhile, given the income disparities between richer and poorer states and regions and the 
rapid population increase, which will bring the developing world’s population to an estimated 
90 percent of the world’s total by 2050, immigration pressure is certain to keep rising.  There 
is bound to be an increase in intermediary players like ethnic networks and trafficking 
organisations, which will assist would-be migrants to reach their destinations. The second part 
                                                 
16
  Der Spiegel, 25/2002, p. 117 
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of this paper analyses in detail the political mechanisms being created to manage forced and 
voluntary migration to Europe, which in the 1990s has become the most important domestic 
political issue in many European countries. 
Major Shifts in National European Migration and Refugee Policies in the 1990s 
During the 1990s, in almost all EU countries the political perception of immigration 
underwent a dramatic change.  This change occurred in the face of momentous events such as 
the fall of the iron curtain and the outbreak of violent conflicts all over the world.  In this new 
environment would-be migrants from the former Soviet bloc enjoyed new freedom to travel 
outside their home countries, hundreds of thousands of civilians from places like Central Asia 
and the former Yugoslavia were forced from their homes, and the EU countries found 
themselves in the position of having to absorb an extremely large influx of new migrants.  In 
Germany, for example, immigration tripled from 1990 to 1993 to the point that the local 
German authorities were completely overburdened with housing and processing all the 
newcomers, mostly ethnic Germans and asylum seekers.  The system’s inability to keep 
immigration satisfactorily ‘under control’ triggered a wave of ant-immigrant sentiment and 
even some very ugly incidents of violence targeted at foreigners.  The situation was not helped 
by a new breed of populist politicians who sought to reap political profits from the public’s 
unease about immigrants. Even in those member states not directly affected by increased 
inflows, asylum seekers were increasingly equated with economic migrants abusing national 
asylum systems. Correspondingly, all countries have shifted their political priorities from 
immigration and refugee protection to fighting irregular immigration.17 
Refugee Policy: Furnishing Fortress Europe 
With regard to refugee policy all European countries have put limits on access to asylum 
procedures, accelerated the decision and appeals processes, and restricted refugees’ labour 
                                                 
17
  The following section is based on SOPEMI Reports, U.S. Committee for Refugees Country Reports, and 
European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) Country Reports (2001), 
http://www.ecre.org/publications/countryrpt01.shtml, and the US Committee for Refugees. World Refugee 
Survey (2002), http://www.refugees.org/pub/wrs02b.cfm, both 24 September 2002.  See also Steffen 
Angenendt, Imke Kruse, Forced Migration and Refugee Protection in the European Union, in: Steffen 
Angenendt and Carolina G. Hernandez (eds.), Foreign Workers, Refugees, and Irregular Immigrants: Political 
Challenges and Perspectives for Asia-Europe Co-operation, Tokyo: JCIE 2002 (forthcoming). 
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market access.  Some countries—especially Southern European countries—have combined 
these policies with new forms of temporary protection.  Others have instead concentrated on 
regularisation campaigns of irregular migrants to re-establish control of the flow of forced 
migration.   
Since the early 1990s, Germany and Austria have been particularly burdened with asylum 
seekers. Along with the Netherlands they were the first countries to introduce stricter 
conditions for access to asylum procedures. Subsequently, other EU countries soon adopted 
these restrictive measures, with regard to six aspects. 
New concepts: “safe countries of origin” and “safe third countries” 
In most European countries except for Belgium, Finland, Ireland, and Italy, asylum seekers 
have to provide far more proof of their political persecution if they come from so-called “safe 
countries of origin”. These are countries considered to be free from persecution, and they are 
usually listed in the national foreigners laws. Asylum applicants from these countries have to 
convince the authorities in an accelerated procedure that they are subject to individual 
persecution.  
In addition, the so-called “safe third country” concept allows the respective government to 
send asylum seekers back to any country they crossed before arriving at their final destination. 
This principle is based on the claim that applications should be filed in the first “safe” place. 
The list of “safe third countries” usually includes EU member states as well as neighbouring 
states. This means that an applicant may be unable to apply for asylum in any of the member 
states if he or she passed through another safe third country. To qualify as a safe third country, 
the country in question must observe international human rights standards and the non-
refoulement principle of the Geneva Convention. Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom make use of this principle even in cases of mere transit 
through a safe third country. 
Acceleration of asylum procedures 
Many states have recently introduced time-constraints, limited procedural safeguards, and 
restricted possibilities to appeal asylum decisions. A typical example is the Netherlands, where 
three measures new measures have been introduced: appeals are replaced with a faster hearing 
 14
in combination with an investigation procedure, the examination period of applications is 
limited to six months, and the grounds for refusals will be revised. As a result, in 2001, in 
about 80 percent of all cases a decision was reached within six months. In the United 
Kingdom asylum seekers must now complete a form that, if applicants are incapable of filling 
them in proper English or simply fail to submit the form within the requested 14-days-period, 
suffices to reject the asylum application. In France, Greece, Italy and Portugal all border 
applications are handled by means of accelerated procedures. Generally, safeguards are limited 
in these procedures where, like in Denmark and Finland, the right to appeal may be restricted, 
and the extent of legal aid may be reduced.  In Germany, Denmark and Spain all asylum 
seekers are entitled to legal assistance at any time of the procedure. In several member states 
forced migrants who are subject to accelerated procedures even have limited social rights, e.g., 
they are not entitled to medical screening and have no access to education.18 
Lowering Protection Standards 
As a complementary measure to these restrictive reception policies, most EU member states 
have introduced a special status for civil war refugees: Germany offered temporary protection 
for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and from Kosovo, and according to the 1997 Swedish 
Immigration Law, foreigners may be granted residence for humanitarian reasons, for instance, 
if they are threatened with torture or other forms of inhumane treatment, and refugees from 
civil war regions may be granted a two-year residence permit.  
In the United Kingdom, in order to avoid the overburdening of asylum procedures in cases of 
a mass influx of refugees, an “exceptional leave to remain” was introduced on the basis of 
humanitarian grounds or unsettled conditions in the countries of origin. This status can be 
granted for four years (under certain conditions also to rejected asylum seekers). It has been 
used for Bosnian refugees for example. Similar provisions were developed in Spain. 
In France, the leftist government that ruled the country from 1997 to 2002 passed a new law 
for foreigners that also granted refugee status to a larger group of immigrants by broadening 
the range of legitimate reasons qualifying for protection. The government introduced the 
concept of “territorial asylum” to victims of non-state persecution, to rejected asylum seekers 
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  Directorate General for Justice and Home Affairs. Comparative Analysis of Reception Conditions for Persons 
seeking protection in the Member States of the European Union. Brussels 2000: 34. 
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who could face torture, and to people whose life would be under threat in their home country. 
In practice, this status was only granted in 30 cases in 1998.19 In 1999 Greece also introduced 
a temporary status for rejected asylum seekers who cannot be returned for humanitarian 
reasons. So far, this status has been granted mainly to refugees from Iraq. 
Deteriorating Benefits and Accommodation 
In principle, asylum seekers are provided with accommodation, basic health care and social 
benefits in all EU member states. However, during the 1990s several states reduced these 
benefits below the standards of welfare benefits for citizens, and certain groups of forced 
migrants have been totally excluded from these benefits, for instance those who lack personal 
papers or who have committed criminal offences. These individuals must refer to charitable 
organisations, which are often overburdened. In a number of countries, material assistance has 
been substituted for financial aid to reduce economic incentives to apply for asylum.  
Detention Centres and Deportation 
In many EU countries detention centres have been built for irregular immigrants or those new 
immigrants who are denied entry at the border. Thus, detention at the beginning is used to 
obtain information about travel routes and identities of the persons seeking protection to 
ensure repulsion at the border, while detention at the end of the procedure is used to facilitate 
deportation. In some countries, living conditions in these centres have been seriously criticised 
by human rights groups. In addition, in all EU countries substantial efforts have been made to 
deport rejected asylum seekers. In Austria, for example, this even holds for asylum seekers 
who are in a second-instance appeal procedure. 
In several states (e.g., Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom) asylum seekers may now be 
distributed throughout the country to ease the burden on individual communities and to 
prevent the disappearance of rejected asylum seekers. In Austria, since the 1997 Asylum Act 
asylum seekers may be detained during the procedure to ensure their deportation in case their 
request is denied. In Greece, detentions are routinely used to reduce irregular immigration (in 
2001 alone, about 220,000 irregular immigrants were arrested), including a significant 
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  European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). Social and legal conditions for asylum seekers and 
refugees in Western Europe: France. Brussels 2000. 
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proportion of forced migrants. Some countries even restrict the free movement of individuals 
seeking protection in a number of ways. For example, Germany and Denmark require 
applicants to stay three months in a mandatory accommodation that they assign to asylum 
seekers immediately after their filing of an asylum claim. 
All in all, restrictive approaches are having the effect of bringing down the numbers of asylum 
seekers in the EU member states that implement them.  The experience of the 1990s was that 
asylum applications dropped off when governments introduced restrictive policies.  However, 
they promptly went up in surrounding countries until they compensated by introducing 
restrictive measure of their own.  Thus, a race is now under way to have the most restrictive 
immigration laws in the region.  The trend appears set to continue, and the laws may become 
more and more restrictive until international human rights standards do not permit them to go 
any further.   
Migration Policies: Makeshift and Masquerade 
At present the European Union states offer labour-migrants only very limited channels for 
legal immigration from outside the EU.  In the post war decades most of the heavily 
industrialised states of Northern and Western Europe enacted Guest Worker programmes to 
shore up their labour forces and stimulate economic growth.  Guest Worker programmes 
generally took the form state-set quotas for migrant workers or bilateral agreements with other 
states, and often operated through government offices actively recruiting workers in the 
countries of origin.  The programmes were always meant to be temporary.  However, after the 
recession triggered by the 1973 ‘oil crisis’, most of the state programmes were called off.  
Since the mid-1970s there has been an official labour recruitment stop.  Ironically, the 
recruitment stop had reverse effects:  While it did cut off new labour immigration, it also 
prompted many of the temporary guest workers to stay in Europe permanently.  It thus laid the 
foundation for the foreign population in today’s Europe.  Under national and EU law, no job 
may now be filled by a third state national unless it cannot be filled by a domestic worker or 
another EU citizen.   
Nevertheless, several states are highly dependent on steady flows of migrant labour, and 
certain exceptions to the ‘non-recruitment’ policy have been made.  For example, various 
Member States do allow for temporary employment of foreigners in seasonal industries such 
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as agriculture and tourism.  Such contracts are only short term and do not allow for permanent 
settlement. Foreign students too are increasingly viewed as a potential source of valuable 
talent for the local economies, and some states now are open to the option of converting 
student visas into more permanent work visas.  The practice is extensive in some states.  For 
example, in 2000 Germany issued 340,000 temporary labour contracts.  Such a high figure 
indicating heavy dependency on foreign labour, even though the recruitment stop officially 
indicates the opposite.  As mentioned above, the most important legal immigration channel 
today is family reunification.  Many states have, however, introduced waiting periods for 
reunification with spouses and children and restricted access to the labour market.  Ethnic 
communities residing outside of the nation states, such as ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, also enjoy privileged access to citizenship and the labour market. In 
addition, most states also administer special recruitment schemes for highly skilled workers.  
The recruitment schemes for technology specialists are the most well known, but similar 
programs also exist for a wide variety of professions from employees in international 
corporations and academicians to performers and specialty chefs.  It should be pointed out 
though that even this kind of recruitment only provides a very small fraction of the labour 
supply, it still tends to avoid permanent settlement. The German government’s Green Card 
program, for instance, reflects an earnest effort to import technology specialist from outside 
Germany.  But the Green Cards circumscribe the workers’ flexibility once they arrive in the 
country and are limited to five years in duration.  In other words, they do not go far enough to 
genuinely welcome outsiders, and not surprisingly the government has been disappointed with 
the demand.  Programs like this are a start, but alone they will never be an effective solution to 
Europe’s structural deficiencies. 
Irregular Migration: Regularisation Policies, Identity Controls and Enforcement 
In the 1990s, some EU countries experienced a strong increase in irregular immigration.20 In 
order to re-establish control, regularising irregular immigration became a priority especially 
for Southern European countries such as France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
In France, regularisation programs were implemented as early as 1981/82 and again in 
 18
1997/98. Approximately 121,000 irregular immigrants benefited from the first program and 
about 78,000 from the second one. The second campaign was primarily focused on 
regularising those family members who had already been living illegally in France, especially 
Algerians and Moroccans. These legalisation campaigns, both of which were introduced by 
the governing Socialist Party, were very controversial domestically.  Regularisation programs 
have also been a substantial part of migration policy in Italy, Spain, and Greece.  Although the 
primary motive of the regularisation campaigns is to re-establish control over those who have 
entered the country clandestinely, this policy can also be characterised as a kind of retroactive 
immigration management strategy, which allows the state to fill employment gaps.  In Spain 
for example, the overwhelming majority of immigrants find employment as agricultural 
workers, making the largely agricultural southern part of the country highly dependent upon 
this source of inexpensive labour.   
In stark contrast to regularisation policies, several EU member states have recently introduced 
more stringent identity controls, including a legal basis for fingerprinting asylum seekers 
(Eurodac). In Denmark for instance, the applicants’ fingerprints can be recorded as part of the 
application procedure in order to establish identity and entitlement to the asylum procedure.  
Furthermore, Danish authorities have the right to require immigrants to take a DNA test if they 
seek to invite family members to live with them. Since 1998, most EU states have also 
required the inspection of travel documents at check-in for so-called “high risk flights”, i.e., 
those flights with the greatest likelihood of carrying potential asylum seekers. As a result, 
transportation companies have to check the validity of visas of particular travellers. This 
measure has proven effective in preventing some forced migrants from applying for asylum. 
Several EU countries have also turned to military forces to support border authorities, 
especially in Southern EU countries. The Italian government, for example, reported that in 
2001 about 20,000 irregular boat people were discovered with the assistance of military 
forces, and that at least twice that number is estimated to have slipped into the country 
undetected. Italy has deployed its navy to Albanian harbours to stop irregular migrants.  
Greece has deployed land mines on its border with Turkey that since 1999 have reportedly 
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  Steffen Angenendt, Imke Kruse. Irreguläre Wanderungen und Internationale Politik. In: Matthias Blum, 
Andreas Hölscher, Rainer Kampling (Ed.). Die Grenzgänger. Wie illegal kann ein Mensch sein? Opladen 
2002: 11-24. 
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killed at least 20 irregular immigrants. Since 1996, more than one million Albanians have been 
stopped by Greek authorities at the Albanian-Greek border alone. Spain has undertaken 
substantial efforts to better cope with the growing influx of undocumented immigrants and 
asylum seekers from the Canary Islands and across the Strait of Gibraltar, coming from the 
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (in 2001, about 15,000 irregular immigrants from these 
origins were apprehended).  
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States several EU governments 
introduced new anti-terror policies that would allow them to better control inflows of migrants 
and refugees and to monitor them during their residence. As a part of theses measures, 
national and international data sharing between government agencies shall be improved. 
Additional measures were discussed to exclude potential terrorists from asylum procedures 
and to facilitate their deportation.  
The German government responded to September 11 with two security laws.21 First, changes 
in the association law expanded the state’s power to proceed against extremist associations. 
Secondly, asylum law was modified to completely disallow persons demonstrably planning or 
supporting acts of terrorism from entering the country. Possibilities for deportation were also 
expanded. 
Even the European Commission deliberated on internal security and published a working paper 
on the “relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with international 
protection obligations and instruments”22. 
To sum up, the immigration and asylum laws of the EU Member States tend to be rather 
similar, but there are also substantial differences.  One reason for the differences is the fact 
that the EU states—despite their similarities and relative prosperities when compared with 
other regions of the world—have very different migration traditions.  Some countries have 
historically been countries of emigration, and some of these, like Germany, have become 
immigration countries only in the twentieth century.  Others, like France, have had a longer 
tradition as immigration countries.  These differing historical experiences have repercussions 
on the level and structure of migration and on the crafting of national policies.  To illustrate, 
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  Cf. http://www.bmi.bund.de/dokumente/Pressemitteilung/ix_61828.htm, 3 September 2002. 
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  Cf. http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/wdc/2001/com2001_0743en01.pdf, 3 September 2002. 
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the foreign presence in the member states varies enormously, from 1.6 percent in Portugal to 
36 percent in Luxembourg.  This raises the question of how the ongoing political integration 
under way in Europe will impact this policy field.  The removal of internal border controls 
within the territory has already been accomplished, so it is obvious that consensus must 
somehow be achieved on the development of a common asylum and immigration policy in 
order for political integration project to continue. In order to view the issues from this 
perspective, a brief overview of the cooperation in this area is necessary.   
The European Co-operation in Migration and Refugee Policies 
The Treaty of the European Economic Community signed by six European states  in 1957 was 
the first major step toward European integration to be taken in the post war period and was the 
precursor of today’s European Union.  The member states did not envision a common 
European migration policy for third country nationals, but only the free movement of 
European Community (EC) citizens. In 1974, the European Council discussed the abolition of 
internal European border controls for the first time. Ten years later, the European Commission 
pointed to the necessity of abolishing internal border controls by 1992 and to intensifying 
external border control, police co-operation and reconciliation in the field of asylum and 
migration policy. In 1987, the “Ad-hoc Group on Immigration” with five working groups 
(asylum, visa, communication, false documents, and external border) was appointed for the 
co-ordination of immigration and asylum policies of the member states.  
The first Schengen Treaty (1985) established a new form of intergovernmental co-operation 
between some of the EC member states in the field of migration and asylum policy. France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands agreed upon a step-by-step reduction of 
border controls. In 1990, the second Schengen Treaty substantiated the project, for example in 
terms of visa regulations, responsibility for asylum applicants, co-operation of police and judicial 
authorities, and the establishment of a so-called Schengen Information System (SIS). The latter 
came into force in 1995. Since then, all EC member states except for the United Kingdom and 
Ireland have joined the treaty. 
The 1990 Dublin Convention introduced procedures for determining which member states were 
responsible for hearing individual asylum claims.  The aim was to prevent so-called ‘asylum 
shopping,’ the practice of applying for asylum under another jurisdiction after the rejection of an 
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initial claim.  In other words, all refugees are allowed to apply for asylum in Europe only once. 
With respect to this agreement, the lack of procedural guarantees, e.g. the right to appeal, has 
increasingly become a source of complaints.  Naturally, effective implementation of the Dublin 
Convention would require a high level of harmonisation of asylum procedures within the EU.  
Some important steps have been taken to get the Dublin Convention up and running, notably a 
variety of measures aimed at helping the member states track the secondary movements of asylum 
seekers after arrival in EU territory.  Still, differences on many important questions remain.   
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union established the EU and helped integrate at 
least part of the intergovernmental co-operation into Community law: The EC assumed 
responsibility for visa regulations while the rest of migration and asylum policy remained the 
responsibility of member states as “matters of common interest”. While the Maastricht Treaty did 
include some measures aimed at harmonising asylum and migration policies, it did not oblige 
member states to co-operate. 
In this sense, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union, which came into effect in 1999, 
represented a profound change. Important parts of migration and asylum policies were brought 
under the EU’s jurisdiction, and an “area of freedom, security and justice” (Article 2) was 
proclaimed. The member states committed to developing common migration and asylum policies 
within five years and then – after the casting of a new vote – to decide if majority voting should be 
applied to this policy field, which would be an important step towards harmonisation. Until this 
change takes effect in 2004, decision-making will continue to be carried out on intergovernmental 
basis. In the meantime, common regulations have to be worked out for questions of free 
movement of all people within the Union’s territory, for the abatement of irregular migration and 
the repatriation of migrants as well as for minimum standards of external border control, 
temporary protection and for the admission of asylum applicants. So far, questions of burden 
sharing, long-dated visa and right of residence of third country nationals are excluded from the list.  
At the 1999 European Council meeting in Tampere (Finland), the member states agreed to work 
towards establishing a Common European Asylum System on the basis of the Geneva Refugee 
Convention, a Europe-wide fair treatment of third country nationals, common measures to control 
migration flows, and a European Charter of Basic Civil Rights. The envisioned European Asylum 
System is supposed to include common standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure, 
common minimum conditions of reception of asylum seekers, and the approximation of rules on 
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the recognition and content of the refugee status. After the Tampere meeting, the European 
Commission established a so-called ‘scoreboard’ as a schedule for the development of a common 
migration and asylum policy. 23  
Since Tampere, the European Commission has emerged as a “pacemaker” of a European 
migration and asylum policy and has presented nearly twenty communications and proposals for 
EU directives in this policy field, which, in total, frame a comprehensive and liberal policy.24  In 
September 2000, the Council founded the European Fund for Refugees and agreed upon the 
establishment of Eurodac, a system to compare fingerprints necessary for an effective application 
of the Dublin Convention. In addition, a Council directive on minimum standards for granting 
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons has been adopted.  
The political importance of these developments in the field of asylum and refugee policy during 
the last decade can hardly be exaggerated. Yet, as long as unanimity is needed for nearly all 
decisions, a common European policy will be difficult to establish.25 There exist numerous severe 
disputes among member states that need to be solved like the recognition of non-state and gender-
based persecution, the access to protection, the human conditions in asylum procedures, 
regulations of family reunification, the question of temporary protection, the protection of the most 
vulnerable groups (women and separated children) and the social integration of refugees in the 
receiving countries. 
For the time being, European immigration policy is a work in progress, and no one can say with 
certainty which direction it will take in the future.  The agendas from the Union’s regular Justice 
and Home Affairs meetings show that the questions are very much alive and continue to be hotly 
debated.  However, little of consequence has recently been implemented.  There are some signs 
that the Member States are more and more reluctant to liberalise immigration and asylum policy 
and critically to transfer authority over the issue to the EU institutions.  These policies are still 
closely guarded bastions of national sovereignty.  Nevertheless, if and how the integration of 
migration and asylum policies plays out, the project will face certain challenges that can already be 
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seen on the horizon. 
Challenges for the European Countries 
Obviously, in the near future, Europe will be confronted with additional migration flows, and 
some of them also with increasing ethnic heterogeneity. Finding adequate political 
arrangements for this new reality will be one of the major political challenges in the coming 
years.  
Economic Challenges: Globalisation and Labour Shortages  
In the future, all EU countries will need more immigrants. One reason is the demographic 
process of ageing populations confronting all these societies. This will have repercussions on 
labour markets, on social security systems, and in a much broader sense on these countries’ 
economic capacity for innovation.  
Several EU countries are now facing severe labour shortages, especially with regard to highly 
skilled workers and low-skilled workers in the service and agricultural sectors. Even in 
countries with high domestic unemployment these shortages cannot be filled from the 
domestic labour market, by any combination of currently available strategies.26  
Strategies so far proposed for Europe to cope with these labour shortages include better 
integration of unemployed people into the economic process, more older employees, work 
permits for immigrants who are living in the respective countries but who are not yet allowed 
to work, promotion of employment amongst women, and enhanced education and training 
systems. But the economically advanced countries still need to import labour, especially 
highly skilled labour. Obviously, domestic unemployment is a serious political impediment to 
doing so.  Therefore, strong political leadership is essential to promote the idea of additional 
immigration. The need to compete for immigrants is already being felt as current intensified 
efforts by some states to attract “high potentials” demonstrate: the competition for the ‘best 
brains’ is under way.   
A related aspect is the question of brain drain. During the 1980s this emigration of skilled and 
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highly skilled persons from less prosperous countries was regarded as a kind of post-colonial 
exploitation of scarce resources. However, as a result of a more careful evaluation, it has 
become clear that under certain conditions emigration by skilled workers can have benefits for 
the country of origin.  Some countries like South Korea and the Philippines benefit by training 
skilled workers, nurses for example, to work abroad, and a substantial number of migrants re-
migrate bringing capital and entrepreneurial expertise back home with them. Obviously, the 
economic effects of emigration depend on the general conditions prevailing in the respective 
country, especially on the extent of the availability of surplus skilled workers. But sometimes, 
the emigration of skilled workers actually helps to ease tensions on the labour market.  Many 
Asian countries including Pakistan actively promote emigration in pursuit of various economic 
and social goals. 
Demographic Challenges: Ageing and Shrinking Populations 
In addition, most EU countries have rapidly ageing populations. Life expectancy has been 
increasing for decades while the number of children born per family has decreased. The long 
term effects are dramatic: The age group with low birth rates will have even fewer new born 
children for each age group than the generation before them. This means that the number of 
births will continue to decline in the future. This is radically changing the age structure within 
countries. Population projections of the United Nations show that in all EU countries (except 
Ireland) the proportion of people over 65 years of age will double in the next 50 years. 
Short-term changes in behaviour cannot significantly hinder this demographic development. It 
is therefore certain to have considerable consequences for national economic development and 
the employment markets and to cause serious problems for the social security systems. 
Countries depend on having a sufficient number of gainfully employed people continuously 
working in order to provide for a smaller number of children, adolescents, and elderly people. 
Despite the fact that for nearly two decades inflows of migrants and refugees have clearly been 
of greater importance in demographic development than natural population growth, up to now 
European policy makers have not sufficiently responded to this demographic challenge.  
According to figures from the OECD, the EU states would have to allow a net immigration of 
47 million people of working age, just to compensate for the increasing age burden occurring 
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between 2010 and 2020.27 This would be seven times the net immigration that took place 
between 1985 and 1995. A policy allowing such a high net immigration is too enormous and 
under current conditions too impractical to be seriously considered. Although it cannot 
completely counteract the demographic forces now in motion, policy makers will need to 
embrace immigration as a means of coping with their ageing population problems.  Thus, 
demographic developments have as yet no direct impact on migration flows, but this may 
change when Europe begins to experience the consequences of ageing and shrinking 
populations. 
Humanitarian Challenges: International Obligations and Political Pressure 
Policy-makers and the European general public are finding it more and more difficult to 
distinguish between forced and voluntary migration. Too often migrants do not leave their 
homes voluntarily, but are forced to leave their countries by sheer economic necessity. On the 
other hand, refugees are not always politically persecuted on an individual basis, but are trying 
to escape general violence or ruined economic living conditions. In addition, migrants and 
refugees use similar networks and draw more and more on smugglers to get access to 
countries with restrictive immigration regulations. 
These developments pose a serious political challenge in Europe, because they fuel public 
scepticism in the receiving countries of the respective government’s capability to control 
immigration. In the era of globalisation with decreasing political power of nation states, 
continuing resistance to the erosion of national sovereignty, and reduced legitimacy of 
governance, this has become a highly symbolic policy field. The problem of distinguishing 
between refugees and migrants and of managing these mixed flows can only be addressed by 
well-defined and comprehensive policies for both migration and asylum.  This means a 
transparent and well-defined integration policy that opens legal channels for those migrants 
needed for economic and demographic reasons.  Lucid policies are also required for 
immigrants taken in on humanitarian grounds and for their families.  
For Europe the main challenge with regard to forced migrants is to offer protection to 
persecuted and threatened individuals and groups of people and to fulfil the EU states’ 
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commitments as reliable members of the international community. This primarily means 
strengthening and promoting the international refugee protection system based on the Geneva 
Refugee Convention and the European Human Rights Convention. In so doing, it is essential 
to adhere to the principles of the Convention, especially to the principle of Non-refoulement, 
and to interpret the Convention liberally. Generally, the EU member states must be generous 
towards those who are entitled to protection and assistance while strictly enforcing the law 
where abuses occur. This includes fair procedural provisions that facilitate rapid decision-
making regarding requests for protection. Limited protection against persecution and 
procedures that leave refugees in the dark about their future for a prolonged period of time 
runs counter to this objective. 
Effective refugee policy not only depends on general legal and procedural conditions, but it 
also focuses on the local population’s acceptance of refugees. In the long term, the protection 
of refugees cannot be implemented unless the host society supports the policy. However, the 
fact that in many European states many persons who clearly do not need protection in fact 
receive it reduces both the local population’s acceptance and its readiness to bear the financial 
and social burden associated with their continued stay in the country. The credibility and 
integrity of asylum procedures also suffer as a result. It must be ensured that persons who need 
protection actually receive it and those who do not must return to their homeland once their 
application has been rejected. 
In general, asylum policy must provide adequate forms of protection for persecuted people. 
That is a basic humanitarian obligation of modern civilisation, democracy, and civilised 
international relations. Therefore, a comprehensive protection system is needed. This system, 
taking care of persecuted individuals and groups, including additional provisions for 
temporary protection, needs to be in line with the respective country’s international 
humanitarian obligations. An additional challenge is the treatment of smuggled and trafficked 
forced migrants, balancing respect for the human rights of those who use the assistance of 
smugglers to gain access to the host country with the need to police this very dangerous 
activity. 
Social Integration of Migrants: Preventing the Rise of a New Under Class 
Another political challenge is a better social integration of immigrants. Despite the integration 
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efforts that have been conducted in several European countries since the 1970s, much work 
still needs to be done to achieve true economic and social integration, which is another 
prerequisite for the public acceptance of immigrants by host societies. Today most immigrants 
who entered Europe since the 1970s are significantly worse off than natives.  This holds for 
nearly all immigrant groups and is manifested in every measurable respect (i.e. housing, 
schooling, employment, etc).  Migrants in Europe now constitute a new underclass, and in 
economic terms they still play the role of cyclic shock absorbers, in other words the first to 
lose their jobs in times of recession.  This is just as true for those with temporary work permits 
as for those on long-term contracts.  More successful integration will require a permanent 
political and social undertaking involving all the people living in the countries concerned with 
immigrants participating on equal terms in the economic, social, political, and cultural life. 
Integration also needs to promote tolerance, acceptance, and mutual respect between different 
groups of the population. The host country must provide opportunities for integration, and 
immigrants should be entitled and obliged to make use of them. On the other hand, a 
willingness on the immigrants’ part to learn the language of the host country, recognise its 
legal system, and accept its basic values is also indispensable.  
However, the pursuit of these strategies is hindered by a variety of factors, among them the 
fact that immigrant groupings are far from homogenous. While many are well educated and 
have found their place in the society, others have not. Thus, integration policy must be tailored 
to fit the different needs especially of people with fewer chances for participation, such as 
foreign children and adolescents, women, and unemployed persons. 
Regional Harmonisation of National Policies: Sovereignty vs. Supranationalism 
An important challenge for European asylum and migration policies in general is to integrate 
national policies into the common European policy the member states agreed to create in the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty.  Still, at present national migration and asylum policies differ greatly 
from member state to member state. The European Commission has the difficult task of 
proposing rules that balance the interests of all EU countries with the necessity of promoting 
European integration.  It has presented several proposals for nearly all aspects of a future 
common asylum and migration policy. The member states are obliged to encourage these 
harmonisation efforts and contribute to bringing about a rapid agreement on the intended 
measures. In reality, the member states’ own national interests differ greatly, and the entire 
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project of integration in this policy field has been called into question.  
Migration and Security: New Threats, New Strategies? 
With respect to the growing concern about security risks posed by international terrorism, a 
precondition for addressing security effectively would be to develop more sophisticated entry-
exit control systems and to find ways for an international exchange of the information gained 
through these systems. The currently existing systems are unsatisfactory in both Asian and 
European countries. Too often there are rigid entry controls, but hardly any exit controls. 
Even if these controls were tightened, the possibility that terrorist organisations could use 
smuggling and trafficking operations to move persons clandestinely would remain open. For 
the time being, there is little empirical evidence that this has occurred in Asian or European 
countries. The recent experiences with terrorists are more likely to show that terrorist 
organisations tend to install their members legally in the host countries. Nevertheless, 
especially in the case of future installation of more elaborate entry control and tracking 
systems, one cannot exclude the possibility that terrorist organisations could also use 
clandestine paths to move their people around the world.  
As long as this uncertainty remains, security policy and anti-trafficking policy need to go 
hand-in-hand. This kind of thinking is already under way in the EU and at an intra-Asian level 
through counter-terrorism efforts taken up by Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand who 
were later joined by Malaysia and Cambodia. These states’ co-operation in intelligence and 
information exchange appears to be working in tracking the transnational movement of 
persons linked to international terrorist and criminal organisations. 
Recommendations for Asian-European Co-operation in Asylum and Migration Policies 
In conclusion, there are also a number of strategies that European and Asian governments 
could pursue together to manage migration movements between the two regions cooperatively 
and comprehensively.  The following are some suggestions for future action in this regard. 28   
Generally speaking, a comprehensive asylum and migration policy must address at least three 
                                                 
28
 See also the 2002 Council for Asia-Europe Co-operation’s policy recommendations for the Copenhagen 
ASEM meeting. 
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challenges: safeguarding economic prosperity through a sophisticated migration policy, 
offering protection to those in need while fulfilling international humanitarian commitments, 
and fostering social integration of immigrants. 
Accept and Promote Internal and International Mobility  
Given the growing economic importance of national and international mobility for sending 
and receiving countries, Asian and European governments should engage in a dialogue to 
define rules and regulations that encourage mobility. These should correspond with their 
economic needs, but should also take into account that a protection of their labour forces at 
home and abroad would be a precondition for gaining public support. Political leaders should 
promote the idea of human mobility, and should consider positive experiences made with 
inter-regional guest worker programs and highly-skilled migration schemes. Transaction costs 
limiting mobility, as for example exit fees or prohibitive recruitment fees, should be 
minimised. Above all, additional legal channels for migration need to be opened between Asia 
and Europe for the mutual benefit of both regions. 
An intensified co-operation between Asia and Europe would be highly desirable, because it 
can be expected that Asia will in future become an even more important migration source for 
EU countries, and that it might replace migration from Eastern Europe, which will probably 
soon decline due to the economic and demographic transition of these countries. Thus, to 
develop additional temporary and permanent migration channels between Asia and Europe 
would be of mutual benefit and would also reduce pressure on the European asylum systems. 
Strengthen the Protection of Refugees, IDPs and Migrants 
Most Asian states—especially Southeast Asian states—have neither signed the Geneva 
Refugee Convention nor developed a common regional protection system for refugees.  This 
lack of protection under international law should be addressed as soon as possible. In addition, 
the growing number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Asia warrants new regional and 
international recognition and solidarity. For the year 2002 the EU has budgeted 36.1 million 
Euros to assist Asian refugees and the displaced in Asia.29  These resources are helpful and 
                                                 
29
  Die Europäische Gemeinschaft hilft den Flüchtlingen und Vertriebenen in Asien und Lateinamerika, 
European Commission, Luxembourg: 2002, p. 15 
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should be maintained.  But in order for Asia to become truly effective in relieving suffering, 
legal instruments of protection comparable to the Geneva Refugee Convention must be 
developed.  
The international protection of migrants is even less developed than that of refugees. In many 
countries, serious human rights violations of migrants are reported. It would be in the interest 
of the sending as well the receiving states to adhere to the existing international protection 
schemes such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions and to develop 
additional protection instruments.  
Asian and European policy-makers should engage in a dialogue on how best practices for the 
protection of refugees, IDPs, and migrants can be identified and shared. 
Fight Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants  
Irregular migration, i.e., violation of immigration, residence or labour market regulations, is 
growing world-wide and raises serious political concern in many parts of the world. Irregular 
migration undermines national and regional asylum and migration policies and reduces public 
support for labour migration as well as for refugee protection. The most effective instrument 
to reduce irregular migration would be to open additional legal migration channels. This 
should be combined with information campaigns on immigration policies and living 
conditions of irregular migrants abroad. The protection of undocumented migrants (especially 
women), who often fall victim to international trafficking organisations, should be enhanced. 
Asian and European governments should carefully consider if amnesties for irregular migrants 
would be helpful to uncover these trafficking organisations.  
Second, the fight against trafficking should be expanded through all possible instruments 
developed for combating international organised crime, including intelligence co-operation. A 
continuous discussion on how to control in- and outflows and how to track migration 
movements along with a serious appraisal of migration-related aspects of international 
terrorism must commence. For if an effective system could be created to combat smuggling 
and trafficking while simultaneously regulating migration, it would also pay dividends in 
terms of public support for more liberal immigration policies generally. 
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Involve Civil Society in Migration Policies 
Labour migration in Asia is often conducted through private agencies with little state 
involvement.  In Europe, due to highly regulated labour markets, governments play a more 
significant role. Still, involvement of NGOs and other civil society organisations in Europe 
has steadily increased in recent decades. For example, several refugee assistance organisations 
have emerged and have been incorporated in framing national and European policies. An 
exchange between Asia and Europe on the experiences made with deregulation of labour 
migration policies and civil society involvement in this policy field could be of mutual benefit 
in many ways, including among others in the area of human rights. 
Labour migration policy should also have a human rights dimension. Up to now there has been 
little support from governments of both regions with respect to minimum standards for the 
foreign labour force. Asian and European policy makers should discuss these topics, including 
the question of whether remittances of labour migrants could be used to allocate funds to 
protect foreign workers abroad.  
Promote Social Integration of Migrants and Refugees 
In many Asian and European countries the social integration of migrants and refugees is 
partial at best, especially in countries that officially refuse permanent immigration and that 
have developed only temporary immigration schemes, both for migrants and refugees. But, in 
reality, temporary immigration unintentionally becomes permanent, and a lack of appropriate 
policies often leads to the marginalisation of this part of the population. This is politically and 
economically dangerous and has to be addressed by developing legal instruments which open 
up immigrants’ opportunities for a better economic, social and cultural participation and 
involvement in civil society. 
Nevertheless, in several countries, strategies and instruments for fostering the social 
integration of immigrants have been developed. Asian and European political leaders should 
discuss these matters to identify best practices appropriate for their countries. 
Consider Foreign Policy Aspects in Migration Policies 
Even if in most countries of the world transnational migration is considered a matter of 
domestic policy, it is obvious that migration and refugee movements also have an impact on 
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bilateral and international relations, and therefore are also a subject of foreign policy. In recent 
years, European institutions have started to incorporate this issue into the foreign policy 
agenda through the creation of the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration.  
With regard to Asian and European co-operation, a working group consisting of 
representatives of EU member states, the European Commission, ASEAN and other Asian 
states should develop further policies linking asylum and migration issues and foreign affairs, 
with particular emphasis on tackling the root causes of forced migration. In addition, both 
sides should strengthen their commitment to upholding human rights and monitoring the 
implementation of both public instruments (international conventions, etc.) and private 
instruments (business sector mission statements or codes of conduct) that enforce human 
rights.  
The economically advanced countries should assist developing countries in the design and 
implementation of policies relating to the movement of people, protection of refugees, and 
societal integration of migrants and refugees. Provisions for extra-territorial refugee protection 
or reception “in the region of origin” should only be implemented with caution and only where 
the physical integrity and rights of all persons received or protected are guaranteed. And it 
should be ensured that displaced persons are not forced back into dangerous environments nor 
prevented from leaving their country in search of protection elsewhere. 
Expand Regional Co-operation Within and Between the Regions 
National asylum policies can only be effective if their principles are shared by neighbouring 
states. This is obviously the case in the EU, where a common market with free movement of 
goods, services, capital, and persons has been established and where internal border controls 
have been removed. But it is also true for regional structures with a lower degree of 
integration like ASEAN. Generally, harmonised policies are a comparative virtue for those 
countries participating, and further co-operation between countries of origin and receiving 
states is needed. 
Thus, Asian and European policy makers should first promote co-operation in asylum matters 
within their region. Given the complex nature of this policy field, and given the dominance of 
national interests concerning regulations which might have a deep impact on core aspects of 
national sovereignty, a co-operation in this policy field raises difficult questions. But, in 
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general, common policies are often more sophisticated and comprehensive than national 
policies. The European Commission’s proposals for a common asylum and migration policy 
might serve as an example.  
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